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Nepal’s Civil War and Its Economic Costs

Gyan Pradhan, Ph.D.
Eastern Kentucky University
gyan.pradhan@eku.edu

Abstract
This paper estimates the macroeconomic effects of increased spending on defense and
internal security necessitated by the decade-long Maoist insurgency in Nepal. An
investment equation is specified to examine the relationship between defense
spending and investment. The estimation results indicate that there is a significant
negative effect of defense spending on investment. A simple Harrod-Domar growth
relationship is used to estimate the effect of the increase in defense spending on
economic growth. This analysis suggests that between 1996 and 2006, the
opportunity cost of the conflict in terms of lost output has been about 3 percent of
Nepal’s current GDP.
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Introduction
This paper examines some macroeconomic effects and opportunity costs of
increases in security spending by the Nepalese government to finance its war against the
Maoist rebellion that began in 1996. Since that time, sharp increases in security spending
by the government have resulted in a decline in real investment which, in turn, has
reduced economic growth. In addition to these direct costs, the conflict has also resulted
in significant indirect costs, such as disruptions in trade and commerce, loss in tourism
revenue, a toll on children, loss of infrastructure, and reduction in foreign investment.
Although important, these indirect costs are not the main focus of this paper, so they are
examined only briefly.
Economic theory suggests that an increase in government or military spending
can crowd out private investment and may lead to lower rates of economic growth and
lost output. Alternatively, military spending can also lead to some positive effects on
economic growth through a Keynesian-type expansion whereby an increase in aggregate
demand results in increased output and employment. A number of studies have examined
the effect of higher defense spending on economic growth in developing countries. Some
analysts argue that military spending may have a favorable effect on economic growth.
For instance, Benoit (1973, 1978) shows that military spending positively affected
economic growth for a sample of 44 developing countries from 1950 to 1965. He argues
that military spending increases economic growth, as it improves human capital through
education and vocational and technical training. In addition, research and development
as well as production activities by the military may provide positive externalities to the
civilian sector. He also contends that reducing military spending in developing countries
will not necessarily raise economic growth because only a small fraction of the decrease
in military spending results in productive investment. However, most studies on the
subject find that defense spending tends to have an adverse impact on economic growth,
either directly or indirectly. Examples include studies by Lim (1983), Deger and Sen
(1983), Faini, Annez, and Taylor (1984), Maizels and Nissanke (1985), Deger (1986),
Chan (1986), Grobas and Gnanaselvam (1993), Roux (1996), Pradhan (2001),
Arunatilake et al. (2001), and Ra and Singh (2005).
Still other studies suggest that there is no causal relationship between military
expenditures and economic growth in either direction. For instance, studies by Biswas
and Ram (1986), Payne and Ross (1992), and Kim (1996) found no consistent
relationship between military spending and economic growth. Similarly, Dakurah et al.
(2001) found no causal relationship between military spending and economic growth
based on their study of 62 countries. The empirical literature thus suggests that the
relationship cannot be generalized across countries and may depend on an array of factors
including the period of study, the level of socio-economic development of the country,
and how the military expenditures are financed.
The majority of the studies cited above have used a multicountry approach to
examine the relationship between military spending and economic growth in developing
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countries. While multicountry approaches are useful, a case study approach may be more
illustrative. After all, circumstances and policy responses are likely to vary across
countries and the nature of the policies pursued is likely to affect the relationship between
military spending and economic growth. This paper therefore adopts a case study
approach in an attempt to analyze the economic costs of Nepal’s decade long civil war.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next two sections provide overviews of
the Nepalese economy and the Maoist insurgency. The civil war’s macroeconomic
effects in terms of lower investment and reduced nonmilitary expenditures are then
discussed. This discussion is followed by some quantitative estimates of the opportunity
costs in terms of the economic growth sacrificed and lost output. Some indirect costs
discussed in the subsequent section. The final section summarizes the main findings and
concludes the paper.
Brief Background of Nepal’s Economy 1
Nepal has made some encouraging progress in development since it emerged
from self-imposed isolation in the 1950s, at which time it had virtually no infrastructure.
Access to basic public services such as primary education, health care, electricity, and
sanitation has increased significantly since that time. Almost 90 percent of Nepal’s
primary-aged school children are now enrolled in school. The infant mortality rate has
dropped from 165 (per 1,000 live births) in 1970 to 48 in 2006. Although still among the
lowest in South Asia, life expectancy at birth has increased to 63 years.
Nepal made the transition from absolute monarchy to multiparty democracy in
1990. Unfortunately, democracy also ushered in political instability; there have been 18
governments since 1990. As might be expected, there has been no coherent drive to
promote economic development or to mobilize and utilize domestic revenues efficiently.
The country is faced with low returns on public investments and inadequate government
services. The decade-long civil war, which began in 1996, has claimed more than 13,000
lives.
Between 1990 and 2001, Nepal’s aggregate GDP increased by 5.3 percent per
year and per capita income increased by more than 2.5 percent as the economy responded
to macroeconomic stability and liberalization, and declining population growth rates.
There was also a rapid growth in trade. However, by the turn of the 21st century,
intensification of the Maoist conflict and political instability, together with the effects of
the global recession, led to a sharp reduction in exports, manufacturing, and tourism
services. For the first time in 19 years, negative growth was recorded in 2002. A
slowdown in revenue growth and a sharp increase in security expenditures created an
unprecedented budget crisis. The shortfall in revenue and difficulties in implementing
development programs in conflict areas reduced development spending by about 20
percent. As the budget crisis deepened in 2003, development spending, in real terms, fell
to a ten-year low. GDP growth did recover in 2003 and 2004, registering a 3.4 and 3.7
percent growth rate. The corresponding growth rates for 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008
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were 2.4, 2.9, 2.7 and 5.3 percent.
During the past ten years or so, the headcount poverty rate has dropped sharply to
about 30 percent, although there are wide disparities based on geography, caste, ethnicity
and gender, and inequality in Nepal is the highest in South Asia. With an annual per
capita income of about $470, Nepal remains one of the poorest countries in the world.
Only 35 percent of the women are literate, compared to 63 percent of men. Nepal’s
population of 28 million is still growing at about 2 percent a year, and the ratio of
population to arable land is one of the highest in the world.
The Maoist Insurgency2
In February 1996, after winning only nine out of 205 seats in parliament in earlier
elections, Maoist rebels launched an armed struggle to replace Nepal’s constitutional
monarchy with a communist republic. Given Nepal’s deep rural poverty, caste and ethnic
discrimination, endemic corruption, and a concentration of wealth and power, it is not
surprising that the Maoist message resonated with the Nepali population. Within months,
Maoist leaders created a highly organized insurgency. In August 2001, attempts at peace
talks stalled after three rounds of negotiations over the question of Nepal’s constitutional
monarchy. In November 2001, the Maoists walked out of the negotiations, broke the
ceasefire and resumed attacks on government troops. A state of emergency that lasted for
10 months was imposed, and the army was ordered to fight the rebels for the first time.
Over half of the more than 13,000 deaths occurred since the army joined the fight in
2001.
The government and rebels declared another ceasefire in January 2003. However,
despite several rounds of talks, the two sides could not agree on the role of the monarchy.
The Maoists demanded an election to form a constituent assembly. This assembly would
draft a new constitution that would offer the option of abolishing the monarchy. The
government refused the Maoists’ ultimatum and insisted that the Maoists either surrender
their weapons or tone down their demands to fit existing laws. Some analysts suggest
that the Maoist leadership was also under pressure from within its own ranks, with inured
fighters eager to launch fresh assaults against government forces. The Maoists withdrew
officially from the ceasefire on August 27, 2003 as peace talks between the government
and Maoist insurgents collapsed. The country promptly plunged into more violence.
Even during the so-called ceasefires, both government and Maoist forces
regularly breached the code of conduct that was supposed to govern their activities during
the stops in fighting. Both sides believed that the other was planning an impending
attack. The Maoists continued to recruit heavily and succeeded in penetrating urban
areas. They continued to practice widespread extortion from businessmen, aid groups,
and villagers to fill their coffers. They even fired on a motorcade of a former prime
minister. For their part, the government forces continued to make their presence felt
throughout the countryside and summarily executed people they suspected of being
Maoists in a remote village in eastern Nepal.
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The Maoists had an estimated 4,000 hard-core fighters and a militia of about
15,000. They roamed freely in the countryside and claimed to control 80 percent of the
country. This claim may have been an exaggeration, but it was true that the government
did not exist in most rural areas, which were frequented by roaming Maoist extortionists.
The number of soldiers in the Royal Nepalese Army grew to about 90,0000 by 2005, up
from 45,000 in November 2001 when the army was mobilized to combat the Maoist
rebels. The army headed the unified command, which included its own soldiers, 18,000
armed police and 10,000 policemen deputed from the Nepal Police. The army was
heavily armed with the help of India and the United States, which provided $17 million in
military equipment and training. The army’s outdated weapons were replaced with
mortars, machine guns and M-16 rifles provided by the American, Indian and Belgian
governments, as well as with British and Indian helicopters. Counterinsurgency training
was provided to the government forces by expert teams from India and the United States.
In October 2002, King Gyanendra dismissed the political parties from power and
was unwilling or unable to restore the democratic process. Instead, he took over state
power on February 1, 2005,declared a state of emergency, and severely curtailed
fundamental rights. Subsequently, India, the United States, and the United Kingdom
froze all military aid to Nepal. Three months later, the state of emergency was removed,
primarily to appease the international community, although fundamental rights were not
restored. The king continued to strengthen his absolute powers and targeted leaders of
the political parties. This move by the king pushed the seven parliamentary parties to
form an alliance (SPA) with the Maoists. This alliance organized a mass uprising against
the king, which left more than 20 dead and many more wounded. On April 21, 2006, the
king was forced to relinquish authority and indicated that “power was being returned to
the people.” The Maoists agreed to a cease fire and an “armed management” process.
Under this deal, both Maoist and government armies and arms were to be kept in a secure
place under the supervision of the United Nations. As the country edged toward a
solution to 10 years of civil war, rivalries between caste and ethnic groups threatened the
peace process. A new crop of ethnically-based groups such as the Madhesis (Nepalis
from the southern plains) began making separatist demands regarding an end to
domination by the Brahmins and Chhetris, the two highest Hindu castes. Fourteen
months of protests reaped havoc in the southern Terai region, and scores died in ethnic
and caste-based violence. On December 28, 2007, in an almost unanimous vote, the
interim parliament declared Nepal a federal democratic republic, relegating Nepal’s 240year-old monarchy to oblivion. This historic verdict was conditional on approval by the
first meeting of the constituent assembly.
The elections for the constituent assembly, which is responsible for drafting a new
constitution and which also serves as the parliament, were held on April 10, 2008. The
Maoists won the most seats (220 of 601) but could not form a government because a
president needed to be elected first. In the indirect presidential election, Mr. Ram Baran
Yadav of the mainstream Nepali Congress party won with 308 out of the 590 votes in the
assembly, offering a setback to the Maoists’ hopes of dictating the direction of
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constitutional reforms.
On August 15th, 2008, after months of bickering, Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal
Dahal was elected prime minister, with the support of a large majority of the constituent
assembly, and a Maoist-led coalition government was formed. Trouble, however, began
to brew regarding the intractable issue of the future of the armed forces. Under the peace
agreement, some 23,000 Maoists guerillas were supposed to be integrated into the Nepali
army, which refused to follow the injunction of the Moist-led government. Mr. Dahal
sacked the army chief, but the president, who had the support of almost every other
political party, reinstated him, which led to the resignation of Mr. Dahal on May 4th,
2009. On May 23rd, Madhav Kumar Nepal, the leader of the moderate Unified MarxistLeninist (UML) party became the new prime minister. Although Mr. Nepal has the
support of 21 of the 24 political parties in the assembly, the Maoists, who won 38 percent
of the seats in the assembly, do not support him and have refused to join the new
government.
After another round of bickering, the main coalition partners in the new
government have formed a new cabinet. It is uncertain how long this government will
last or if the Maoists can be coaxed back to the table. A return to civil war still seems
possible. In any event, lasting peace will not obtain unless the dispute regarding the
future of the two armies is resolved. Unfortunately, and as has become common in
Nepali politics, uncertainty looms yet again.
Macroeconomic Effects3
In 1996, when the insurgency began, security spending was about 0.9 percent of
GDP. In 2006, it was 2.5 percent. By some estimates, security expenses grew by over
300 percent between 2000 and 2006, mostly due to the purchase of arms and ammunition.
During 2002, spending on security increased 32 percent to $170 million in a $788 million
budget to purchase advanced weapons and logistics for the police and the army to fight
the insurgency. In 2006, security spending increased by 10 percent to about $280
million. As more money was pumped into the war effort, fewer funds were available for
development. For an extremely poor country whose budget depends on foreign aid for a
third of its total outlay, such disproportionate increases in security spending can be
expected to have lingering and considerable effects.
The effects of the conflict on economic growth and welfare depend in part on how
the government chooses to finance its war. One way the government can finance an
increase in defense spending is to obtain the extra funds by curtailing spending in others
areas such as health, education, and public investment. Another alternative is to borrow
from domestic sources, from the central bank, or from abroad. Following Grobar and
Gnanaselvam (1993), the macroeconomic effects of Nepal’s Maoist insurgency are
examined by first looking at the basic open-economy saving-investment relationship:
I + (G - T) = S + (M - X)

(1)
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where I is investment, G is government consumption, T is tax revenues, S is private
saving, M is imports and X is exports. Dividing government spending into defense
spending (GD), which includes spending on internal security, and nonsecurity spending
(GN), and rearranging, the above identity can be rewritten as:
GD = S - I + (M - X) + (T - GN).

(2)

Equation (2) states that higher defense spending will have to be offset by adjustments in
private saving, investment, the balance of payments, taxes, or nonsecurity spending.
From 1990 to 96, defense spending increased by about 67 percent, and from 1996 to 2006
it increased by 215 percent. While investment increased about 50 percent from 1990 to
1996, it declined by more than 8 percent between 1996 and 1999 and increased about 7
percent from 1996 to 2006. Similarly, while national saving increased by more than 75
percent from 1990 to 1996, it fell by 26 percent from 1996 to 2006. Finally, trade
volume increased 84 percent from 1990 to 1996 but fell by 16 percent from 1996 to 2006.
We see from the data that there has been a significant increase in defense spending and a
decline in real investment.
Nepal continues to rely heavily on foreign savings as a source of investment
finance. There has been a continued inflow of capital as the trade balance has remained
negative. The trade deficit did narrow in the late 1990s, but the gap started to widen in
2003. External debt at about 50 percent of GDP in 1990 continued to increase in
subsequent years, while registering a gradual decline in recent years. Total debt service
as a ratio of GDP was 1.9 percent in 1990 and 1.6 percent in 2003. Total debt service as
a percentage of exports was 15.7 percent in 1990, 6.2 percent in 2002, and about 5
percent in 2006.
It is apparent that the government has had to make some choices to finance its
spending to fight the Maoist insurgency. The data suggests that increased spending on
defense and internal security has been associated with lower investment and reduced
nonmilitary government expenditure, especially in economic services. These trends are
inauspicious; lower investment results on slower growth rates and lower living standards
in the future. In other words, the opportunity costs of increases in defense spending are
likely to be high. These costs are discussed next.
Opportunity Costs
This section provides some quantitative estimates of the opportunity costs of the
civil war in Nepal. An attempt is made to estimate the economic growth sacrificed as a
result of higher spending on defense and internal security. To this end, it is necessary to
estimate the effect of the increased defense spending on investment behavior. Following
Grobar and Gnanaselvam (1993), a model of investment is specified in which the level of
investment depends on the supply of financial resources.
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Resources available to finance investment come from three sources. The first is
private domestic saving, which is a direct function of real per capita income:
SP = S(YP).

(3)

The second source is public or government saving. The ability of the government to
finance investment depends on its ability to raise revenue and its other expenditure
commitments. Spending on defense and internal security reduces the government’s
ability to finance investment. In addition, higher spending on social programs will
reduce funds available for investment. Spending by the government on social programs
has been somewhat lower since 1990, when multiparty democracy was restored. This
reduced spending reflects the increased emphasis placed on market-oriented policies and
lower emphasis on social spending. Thus, public saving available to finance investment
is modeled as:
SG = SG(YP, GD, D)

(4)

where D is a dummy variable reflecting the post-1990 period. Since several years may
elapse before investment behavior is affected by government policy, the dummy variable
is lagged.
The third source of investment finance is foreign saving. Capital flows (K) are
treated as exogenous. We thus have an investment equation of the following form where
investment, defense spending, and capital inflows are measured as ratios of GDP:
I = I(YP, GD, K, D).

(5)

This study is based on annual time series data from 1980 to 2006. Data have been
obtained from several sources--several issues of the Quarterly Economic Bulletin,
published by Nepal Rastra Bank (the central bank), various issues of Economic Survey,
published by Nepal’s Ministry of Finance, the Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific,
available on the Asian Development Bank web site, the International Financial Statistics,
published by the IMF, and World Development Indicators CD-ROM 200. As the
necessary data were not readily available from any single source, it was necessary to rely
on several sources. As might be expected, data from different sources were usually not
compatible.
Estimation and Results4
The results of the estimation (see Table 3) indicate that there is a significant
negative effect of defense spending on investment, even when accounting for other
variables that affect investment behavior. Per capita GDP and capital inflows have a
positive and significant effect on investment behavior. The coefficient on the
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government dummy variable carries the expected positive sign since government policy
after 1990 has been more market and growth-oriented.
The coefficient on defense spending indicates that an increase in the ratio of
defense spending to GDP of 1 percentage point will reduce the ratio of investment to
GDP by about 1.3 percentage points. Following Grobar and Gnanaselvam (1993), a
simple Harrod-Domar growth model is used to estimate the effect of the recent increase
in defense spending on economic growth. Given a fixed incremental capital-output ratio
(ICOR), the basic Harrod-Domar relationship for the economy is:
g = (s/ICOR) - d
where g is the growth rate of output, s is the saving (or investment) rate, and d is the
depreciation rate.
Nepal’s ICOR has varied over time. Calculated from data during the 1990-2006
period, the ICOR ranged from 2 to 2.4. Since the Maoist insurgency began in 1996, the
ratio of defense spending to GDP has increased by 1.1 percentage points. Table 4
indicates that a 1.1 percentage point increase in defense spending, all else constant, will
be associated with a 1.44 percentage drop in the ratio of investment to GDP. Table 4
shows the corresponding change in the growth rate given different assumptions about the
value of the ICOR. The table also shows the estimates of the increased level of defense
spending brought about by the insurgency in terms of reduced output as a result of lower
levels of investment. If we apply an ICOR of 2 for Nepal, the opportunity cost of the
conflict in terms of lost output from 1996-2006 is about 22 billion rupees, or about $315
million, which is about 3 percent of Nepal’s 2007 GDP, not a trivial amount. In addition,
the conflict has a number of other costs such as loss in agricultural production, cost of
personal property, buildings and infrastructure damaged by the conflict, loss of tourism
revenue, and disruptions in trade and commerce. Some of these additional costs are
discussed in the next section.
A note of caution is in order. The Harrod-Domar framework used in this study is
subject to uncertainty over the value of the ICOR and the appropriate depreciation rate.
Calculated ICORs tend to vary considerably due to cyclical effects. As such, the
estimation of the economic growth forgone due to the lower private investment crowded
out by defense spending should be viewed only as a rough approximation.
Indirect Costs
The Maoist conflict in Nepal has resulted in other costs. The conflict has led to a
slowdown in development activities, particularly in rural areas. The Asian Development
Bank estimates that only 88 percent of the targeted government spending was realized,
which has had adverse impacts on health, drinking water, roads, and agriculture.
The tourism industry has been particularly hard hit. Tourism has been Nepal’s
main foreign currency earner, bringing in about 400,000 thousand visitors and more than
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$650 million in revenue every year. An estimated 1.5 million people depend on the
tourism industry, which contributes over 18 percent to the Nepal’s gross domestic
product. If properly managed, it is estimated that the tourism industry could generate
employment for more than 6 million people. The escalation of the conflict with the
Maoists resulted in a sharp drop in the number of tourists. Specifically, tourist arrivals
fell by about 6 percent in 2000, 23 percent in 2001, 24 percent in 2002, and 3 percent in
2005. As a percentage of total exports, tourism revenue declined 24 percent in 1997, 15
percent in 2002, and 40 percent in 2005. Moreover, because tourism has a strong link
with other industries, the downturn in the tourism sector had a significant negative impact
on up to 80 percent of other industries in the country.
The conflict has also had an adverse impact on trade and commerce. Following
trade liberalization policy, exports and imports grew rapidly for much of the 1990s. For
instance, exports increased 36 percent in 1992 and 33 percent in 1994. However, exports
fell by 8 percent in 1996, 14 percent in 1998, 19 percent in 2002, and 13 percent in 2003.
While weak external demand and intensified competition were responsible, production
disruptions emanating from the conflict played an important role. Regular strikes
affected businesses and had adverse effects on foreign investments.
Some analysts have argued that children, particularly those from poor families in
the remote hills, have been among the most severely affected by the conflict. According
to The New York Times (December 9, 2004), human rights groups estimate that tens of
thousands of children were abducted by Maoists and forced to attend indoctrination
camps or have been sent into exile by frightened parents. The Nepalese army is also
alleged to have used children as spies and messengers. Concern Center for Child
Workers in Nepal, a leading child rights organization, has said that hundreds of children
were killed in the violence. An estimated 5,000 children have been displaced as a result
of their parents fleeing to safer towns, 2,000 children have been orphaned, and 10,000
have been denied access to education. Children have died at the hands of both the rebels
and security forces, while some have simply been caught in the crossfire. Thousands of
children face an uncertain future due to the psychological trauma caused by the cycle of
violence. Maoist rebels in particular were blamed for using children on the battlefront.
An international child rights group, the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, says
that children normally began working as porters and messengers and then often ended up
on the frontline. Security forces were also accused of victimizing innocent children on
suspicion of collaborating with the rebels. According to a recent survey, less than 37
percent of children were vaccinated in two districts affected by the rebellion, compared
with a national average of 75 percent. Attacks on teachers forced many teachers to leave,
affecting the education of children.
Summary and Conclusion
This paper has estimated some effects of increased military spending associated
with Nepal’s decade-long civil war that began in 1996. Clearly, the most serious cost of
the conflict has been the loss of over 13,000 lives, but there are clear economic costs of

Nepal’s Civil War and Its Economic Costs
124
the conflict as well. This paper has focused on the macroeconomic effects of increased
security spending as a result of the conflict. Nepal has made some encouraging progress
in development since it emerged from self-imposed isolation in the 1950s. After the
transition from absolute monarchy to multiparty democracy in 1990, economic
performance was encouraging. However, weak political leadership, continued political
instability and, more recently, the Maoist insurgency, have all exacted a severe toll on the
economy.
After brief overviews of the Nepalese economy and the Maoist insurgency, the
macroeconomic effects of increased government spending on defense and internal
security were discussed. Increased defense spending resulted in a decline in real
investment as well as a reduction in spending on economic services. An investment
equation was specified to examine the relationship between defense spending and
investment. After a battery of tests, an error correction model was developed and
estimated. The estimated results indicate that there is a significant negative effect of
defense spending on investment, even when accounting for other variables that affect
investment behavior. Next, a simple Harrod-Domar growth relationship was used to
estimate the effect of the increase in defense spending on economic growth. This
analysis indicates that from 1996 to 2006, the opportunity cost of the conflict in terms of
lost output has been about 3 percent of Nepal’s current GDP. In addition to these direct
costs, the paper has argued that lost tourism revenue, disruptions in trade and commerce,
and a significant toll on children represent some significant indirect costs of the conflict.
Finally, as noted above, data challenges, particularly in obtaining values for the
appropriate ICOR and depreciation rates, have been significant. As such, the results
obtained above using the Harrod-Domar framework should be viewed only as broad
orders of magnitude. They are intended to be a rough approximation of the economic
growth forgone due to the private investment crowded out by increased spending on
defense.

Table 1
Unit Root Test (variables in first difference)
Variable

Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test

Phillips-Perron Test

I

-5.83***

-5.96***

YP

-4.72***

-4.93***

GD

-5.23**

-5.87***

K

-6.16***

-7.62***

Note: ***significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level.
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Table 2
Johansen’s Cointegration Test
Ho

Likelihood Ratio

5% Critical Value

1% Critical Value

r #0

122.6**

84.25

93.28

r #1

96.4**

58.41

66.24

r #2

66.3**

37.62

44.57

r #3

32.8*

19.53

25.49

Note: **rejection of hypothesis at 1% level; *rejection of hypothesis at
5% level.
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Table 3
Estimation of Equation (6)
Variable

ΔI

Constant

0.231
(1.187)

ΔYP

0.124
(3.426)***

ΔGD

-1.281
(3.031)***

ΔK

0.317
(4.481)***

ΔI-1

0.518
(2.981)**

Dummy

1.978
(1.594)

EC

-1.147
(3.128)***

Adjusted R2

0.721

Durbin-Watson

1.875

Breusch-Godfrey

0.782

F

3.729***

RESET F

1.231

Note: ***significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level.
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Table 4
Estimated Economic Effects, 1996-2006
ICOR

Projected Percentage-Point Drop in
Growth Rate by 2006

Estimated Loss of Output, 1996-2006
(Millions of 1994/95 Rupees)

2.0

1.17

22,275

2.5

0.93

17,706

3.0

0.78

14,850

4.0

0.59

11,233
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1

Data in this section have been obtained from the World Bank and Asian Development websites.

2

Some of this discussion is based on the International Crisis Group’s Asia Briefing Paper: “Nepal: Back to the
Gun,” October 22, 2003.

3

Data in this section have been obtained from the Asian Development Bank, Nepal Rastra Bank, and World
Bank websites.

4

Before carrying out the estimation of equation (5), it is important to test for the stationarity of the data
series in order to avoid spurious regression. Following Nelson and Plosser (1982), an augmented DickeyFuller test is conducted using the constant term and trend. In addition to the Dickey-Fuller test, the
Phillips-Perron test (Phillips, 1987; Phillips-Perron, 1988) is also conducted to ensure the stationarity of the
data series. The Phillips-Perron test uses a non-parametric correction to deal with any correlation in the
error terms. Both tests indicate that most of the data series are non-stationary at the level and they all are
stationary at the first-difference level. The test results are reported in Table 1.
After establishing the stationarity of the data series, Johansen’s cointegration test (Johansen, 1988;
Johansen and Juselius, 1990) is conducted to examine the long-run relationship among the variables. This
involves the test of cointegrating vectors. The cointegration test results, reported in Table 2, suggest that
the hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected. The existence of at least one cointegrating vector indicates
that a long-term relationship among the variables exists. Following Engle and Granger (1987), an error
correction model is developed, which involves estimating the model in first-difference form and adding an
error correction term as another explanatory variable. The error correction term is the lag of the estimated
error term, derived by regressing the dependent variable with the independent variables in the model. The
error correction model developed is as follows:
ΔI = b0 + b1ΔYP + b2ΔGD + b3ΔK + b4ΔI-1 + b5Dummy + b6EC + v

(6)

where EC is the error correction term and v is the random error term. To ensure the absence of
specification error, a RESET test (Ramsey, 1969) was also conducted. To ensure the absence of any serial
correlation, in addition to the Durbin-Watson test, the Breusch-Godfrey LM test was also conducted.
Statistics for both of these tests indicate that the estimated results do not suffer from any serial correlation.
The estimation of the error correction model is reported in Table 3.
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